Abstract-In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss proposed a kind of cryptographic primitive called proxy re-encryption. In proxy re-encryption, a proxy can transform a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key into one that can be opened under Bob's decryption key. In 2007, Matsuo proposed the concept of four types of proxy re-encryption schemes: CBE (Certificate Based Public Key Encryption) to IBE (Identity Based Encryption) (type 1), IBE to IBE (type 2), IBE to CBE (type 3), CBE to CBE (type 4). In this paper, we find that if we allow the PKG to use its masterkey in the process of generating re-encryption key for proxy re-encryption in identity based setting, many open problems can be solved. We give the new security models for proxy reencryption in identity based setting, especially considering PKG's involving in the re-encryption key generation process and PKG's master-key's security. We construct the new IND-ID-CPA and the first IND-ID-CCA2 secure proxy reencryption schemes based on BB1 IBE. We also prove their security by introducing some new techniques which maybe have independent interest. At last, we compare our new schemes with existing ones, the results show that our scheme can achieve high security levels and are very efficient for re-encryption and, which are very important for practical applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proxy re-encryption(PRE) comes from the work of Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss in 1998 [2] . The goal of proxy re-encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, without relying on trusted parties. In 2005, Ateniese et al proposed a few new PRE schemes and discussed its several potential applications such as e-mail forwarding, law enforcement, cryptographic operations on storagelimited devices, distributed secure file systems and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam [1] . Since then, many excellent schemes have been proposed [10] , [25] , [20] , [26] , [15] , [27] , [11] , [29] . In ACNS'07, Green et al. proposed the first identity based proxy re-encryption schemes(IDPRE) [15] . In ISC'07, Chu et al. proposed The second author is the corresponding author. This paper is an extended work of [34] , [35] and supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under contract no. 61103230, 61103231, 61272492, 61202492, Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province and Natural Science Foundation of Engineering University of Chinese Armed Police Force.
the first IND-ID-CCA2 IDPRE schemes in the standard model, they constructed their scheme based on Water's IBE. But unfortunately Shao et al. found a flaw in their scheme and they fixed this flaw by proposing an improved scheme [29] . In Pairing'07, Matsuo proposed another few more PRE schemes in identity based setting [27] . Interestingly, they proposed the concept of four types of PRE: CBE(Certificate Based Public Key Encryption) to IBE(Identity Based Encryption)(type 1), IBE to IBE(type 2), IBE to CBE (type 3), CBE to CBE (type 4) [27] , which can help the ciphertext [33] , [24] circulate smoothly in the network. They constructed two PRE schemes: one is the hybrid PRE from CBE to IBE, the other is the PRE from IBE to IBE. Both of the schemes are now being standardized by P1363.3 workgroup [28] . Recently, Tang et al. extended the concept of identity based proxy re-encryption, they proposed a concept of inter-domain identity based proxy re-encryption which aimed to constructing proxy re-encryption scheme between different domains in identity based setting [31] .
A. Main Idea and Contribution
Our contributions are mainly as following: If we follow the principal that all the work PKG can do is just generating private keys for IBE users, it is indeed difficult for constructing PRE based on BB 1 IBE. But if we allow PKG generating re-encryption keys for PRE by using its master − key, we can easily construct PRE based on a variant of BB 1 IBE.
On the Role of PKG in IBPRE and Related Primitives. We challenge the traditional idea of PKG is only responsible to generate private keys. Traditionally when cryptographers design IBE and other related schemes, they assume the PKG can only generate the private keys to the users. The idea situation is that after PKG generating private keys for the whole users, the PKG is shut up to avoid "single-point failure" problem. But we remark that this idea situation can not work in the practical application, we can not predicate all the future users of the system when it was set up. Furthermore, in the IBE systems, there are also requirements of revocation of the identity, which will necessary involved the PKG. Thus many usable IBE systems let their PKG be online 24/7/365. From a practical point, for PRE in the identity based setting, involving PKG in generating re-encryption key can generically help the proxy improve its efficiency, which is very important for practical IBPRE systems, after all, re-encryption is the main operation in the PRE systems. More importantly, involving PKG in generating some "valued ephemeral" maybe bring unexpected benefits to existing identity based primitives. For example, in identity based broadcast encryption, some "valued ephemeral" given by the PKG maybe be very useful for the receivers for decryption, Note the length of this "valued ephemeral" is just constant, instead of linear with the receivers, thus improve the efficiency greatly. Also note this feature can not be shared with the normal public key broadcast encryption schemes.
B. Organization
We organize our paper as following. In Section I-I, we give some preliminaries which are necessary to understand our paper. We propose our new proxy reencryption scheme based on a variant of BB 1 IBE and prove its security in SectionIII. In Section IV, we give the comparison results with previous IBPRE schemes. We give our conclusions in the last Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In the following, we sometimes use notations described in this section without notice. We denote the concatenation of a and b by a||b, denote random choice from a set S by R ← − S.
A. Bilinear groups
Let G and G 1 be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and g be generator of G. We say that G 1 has an admissible bilinear map e : G×G → G 1 . if the following conditions hold.
1) e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab for all a, b. 2) e(g, g) = 1.
3) There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g a , g b ) for all a, b and g. 
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g ∈ G, the randomly chosen integers a, b, c, the random choice of R ∈ G, and the random bits used by A. We say that the (k, t, )-DBDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the DBDH problem in G under a security parameter k.
C. Identity Based Encryption
An Identity Based Encryption(IBE) system consists of the following algorithms. In this section, we give our definition and security model for identity based PRE scheme, which is based on [15] , [31] .
Definition 2: An identity based PRE scheme is tuple of algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, RKGen, Reencrypt):
On input a security parameter, the algorithm outputs both the master public parameters which are distributed to users, and the master secret key (msk) which is kept private.
• KeyGen(params, msk, ID). On input an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * and the master secret key, outputs a decryption key sk ID corresponding to that identity.
• Encrypt(params, ID, m). On input a set of public parameters, an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * and a plaintext m ∈ M , output c ID , the encryption of m under the specified identity.
• RKGen(params, msk, sk ID1 , sk ID2 , ID 1 , ID 2 ).
On input secret keys msk, sk ID1 , sk ID2 , and identities ID ∈ {0, 1} * , PKG, the delegator and the delegatee interactively generat the re-encryption key rk ID1→ID2 , the algorithm output it.
• Reencrypt(params, rk ID1→ID2 , c ID1 ). On input a ciphertext c ID1 under identity ID 1 , and a reencryption key rk ID1→ID2 , outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext c ID2 .
• Decrypt(params, sk ID , c ID ). Decrypts the ciphertext c ID using the secret key sk ID , and outputs m or ⊥. Remark 1: This definition is different from the Definition of IBPRE in the work of [27] . We insist this is a more natural and general Definition for PRE from IBE to IBE. This definition is consistent with the work of [15] , [31] .
B. Our Security Models for IBPRE
In PRE from IBE to IBE, there is no necessary to consider the malicious PKG attack, so we omit PKG in our security model when considering delegator security and delegatee security.
Delegator Security.
In PRE from IBE to IBE, we consider the case that proxy and delegatee are corrupted.
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. In our notation, St is a state information maintained by A while (ID , sk ID ) is the target user's pubic and private key pair generated by the challenger which also chooses other keys for corrupt and honest parties. For other honest parties, keys are subscripted by h and we subscript corrupt keys by x. Oracles O renc proceeds as follows:
where C pki is the ciphertext under the public key pk i , pk i were produced by Keygen CBE , ID j were produced by Keygen IBE , this oracle responds with 'invalid' if C pki is not properly shaped w.r.t. pk i . Otherwise the re-encrypted first level ciphertext
Delegatee Security.
In PRE from IBE to IBE, we consider the case that proxy and delegator are corrupted. secure if the probability
is negligibly close to 1/2 for any PPT adversary A. The notations in this game are same as Definition 3.
PKG Security.
In PRE from IBE and IBE, PKG's master key can not leverage even if the delegator, the delegatee and proxy collude. Definition 5: (PKG-OW) A PRE scheme from IBE to IBE is one way secure for PKG if the probability
is negligibly close to 0 for any PPT adversary A. The notations in this game are same as Definition 3.
C. Our Proposed IND-Pr-sID-CPA Secure IBPRE Scheme Based on a Variant of BB 1 IBE
• The underlying IBE scheme: We give a variant of BB 1 -IBE scheme as follows: Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p (the security parameter determines the size of G). Let e : G × G → G 1 be the bilinear map. For now, we assume public keys (ID) is element in Z * p . We later extend the construction to public keys over {0, 1} * by first hashing ID using a collision resistant hash H : {0, 1} * → Z p . We also assume messages to be encrypted are elements in G. The IBE system works as follows:
1) SetUp IBE (k). Given a security parameter k, select a random generator g ∈ G and random elements
, and params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h). Let mk be the master-secret key and let params be the public parameters. 2) KeyGen IBE (mk, params, ID).
Given mk = g α 2 and ID with params, the PKG picks random
e(d0,C1) .
• The delegation scheme:
) and sends them to the proxy via secure channel. We must note that the PKG computes a dif-
2) Check(params, C ID , ID). Given the delegator's identity ID and
) with params, the proxy re-encrypt the ciphertext C ID into C ID as follows. First it runs "Check", if output 0, then return "Reject". Else computes
We can verify its correctness as following
D. Security Analysis
Theorem 1: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-C is DGA-IBE-IND-sID-CPA secure for the proxy and the delegatee's colluding.
Proof: Suppose A can attack our scheme, we construct an algorithm B solves the DBDH problem in
abc and 0 otherwise. Let
Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows:
1) Initialization. The selective identity game begins with A first outputting an identity ID * that it intends to attack. 2) Setup.To generate the system's parameters, algorithm B picks α ∈ Z p at random and defines
It gives A the parameters params = (g, g 1 , g 2 , h). Note that the corresponding master − key, which is unknown to B, is g a 2 = g ab ∈ G * . 3) Phase 1
• "A issues up to private key queries on 
• "A issues up to rekey generation queries on (ID, ID )".
The challenge B chooses a randomly x ∈ Z * p , sets rk ID→ID = x and returns it to A. He computes w =
and sends it to the proxy. We observe that
but from the simulation, α = a and t 2 = α − aID * , so we can get
Let rk 1 = x, we can get
So the challenge B simulates as follows. He chooses a randomly k 2 , k 3 ∈ Z * p , sets
) and computes
ID −ID * ID−ID * )−α )r returns them to A. We can see
Thus our simulation is indistinguishable from the real algorithm running. Thus our simulation is indistinguishable from the real algorithm running.
• "A issues up to re-encryption queries on (C ID , ID, ID )". The challenge B runs ReEnc(rk ID→ID , C ID , ID, ID ) and returns the results. 4) Challenge When A decides that Phase1 is over, it outputs two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G. Algorithm B picks a random bit b and responds with the
Otherwise, C is independent of b in the adversary's view. 5) Phase2 A issues queries as he does in Phase 1 except natural constraints. 6) Guess Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
Algorithm B concludes its own game by outputting a guess as follows. If b = b , then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g) abc .
Otherwise it outputs 0 meaning T = e(g, g)
abc .
When T = e(g, g) abc then A's advantage for breaking the scheme is same as B's advantage for solving DBDH problem.
Theorem 2: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-C is DGE-IBE-IND-sID-CPA secure for the delegator and proxy's colluding.
Proof: The security proof is same as the above theorem except that it does not allow "A issues up to rekey generation queries on (ID, ID * )", for B does not know the private key corresponding to ID * . Theorem 3: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-C is PKG-OW secure for the delegator, delegatee and proxy's colluding.
Proof:
We just give the intuition for this theorem. The master-key is g α 2 , and delegator's private key is sk ID = (g
, the proxy reencryption key is rk ID→ID = ( αID +t2+k1
). Because the re-encryption key rk ID→ID is uniformly distributed in (Z * p , G, G, G), and the original BB 1 IBE is secure, we can conclude that g α 2 can not be disclosed by the proxy, delegatee and delegator's colluding.
E. Toward Chosen Ciphertext Security
As we all know, just considering IND-sID-CPA security is not enough for many applications. We consider construct IND-Pr-ID-CCA secure IBPRE based on a variant of BB 1 IBE. There are two ways to construct IND-Pr-ID-CCA secure IBPRE. One way is considering CHK transformation to hierarchal variant of BB 1 IBE to get IND-Pr-sID-CCA secure IBPRE or get IND-Pr-IDKEM-CCA secure IBPRE. The other way is considering variant of BB 1 IBE in the random oracle model. From a practical viewpoint, we construct an IND-Pr-ID-CCA secure IBPRE based on a variant of BB 1 IBE in the random oracle model. Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p(the security parameter determines the size of G). Let e : G × G → G 1 be the bilinear map. Identities are represented using distinct arbitrary bit strings in {0, 1}
l . The messages (or session keys) are bit strings in {0, 1} l of some fixed length l. We require the availability of five hash functions viewed as random oracles:
1) SetUp. To generate IBE system parameters, first select three integers α, β, γ ∈ Z p at random. Set g 1 = g α , g 2 = g t1 and h = g t2 in G, and compute v 0 = e(g, g)
αβ . The public system parameters params and the masterkey are given by: params = (g, g 1 , g 3 , v 0 ), masterkey = (α, β, γ). Strictly speaking, the generator need not be kept secret, but since it will be used exclusively by the authority, it can be retained in masterkey rather than published in params.
2) Extract. To generate a private key d ID for an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * , using the masterkey, the PKG picks random s 0 , s 1 ∈ Z * p , choose a hash function H : Z * p × {0, 1} * → Z * p and computes
). The PKG preserves (s 0 , s 1 ). 3) Encrypt. To encrypt a message M ∈ {0, 1} l for a recipient {0, 1} * , the sender chooses a randomly δ ∈ G and computes
s , and then outputs C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 5 ). 4) ReKeyGen. The PKG computes u 1 = H(s 1 , ID ) and randomly selects
) and sends it to the proxy via secure channel. We must note that the PKG computes a different (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) for every different user pair (ID, ID ).
with params, the proxy re-encrypts the ciphertext C ID into C ID as follows. a) First it computes v 0 = e(C 5 , g) and
, if either checks fails, returns ⊥, otherwise returns M . b) To decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext
, if either check fails, returns ⊥, otherwise returns M .
G. Security Analysis
Theorem 4: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-F is DGA-IBE-IND-ID-CCA secure for the proxy and delegatee's colluding.
Proof: Let A be a p.p.t. algorithm that has nonnegligible advantage in attacking the scheme proposed in Section III-F. We use A in order to construct a second algorithm B which has non-negligible advantage at solving the DBDH problem in G. Algorithm B accepts as input a properly-distributed tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , R) and outputs 1 if R = e(g, g)
abc . We now describe the algorithm B, which interacts with algorithm A as following. B simulates the random oracles H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 as follows.
1) H 1 : {0, 1} * → Z * q . On receipt of a new query for ID = ID * , return t ← R Z * q and record (ID, t); On receipt of a new query for ID * , select randomly T ∈ Z * q , return T and record (ID * , T ).
l . On receipt of a new query δ, select p ← {0, 1} l and return p. Record the tuple (δ, p).
Our simulation proceeds as follows: 1) Setup. B generates the scheme's master parameter as following. First it lets g 1 = g a , g 2 = g b , g 3 = g c , algorithm B picks α ∈ Z p at random and defines h = g In the Guess stage, let ID * be the target identity, and parse the challenge ciphertext c * as
. In both phases, B responds to A's queries as follows.
• On (extract, ID), where(in the Guess)stage ID = ID * , B selects randomly
We claim sk IDi is a valid random private key for ID i . To see this, let r i = r i − b H1(IDi)−T . Then we have that
• On (rkextract, ID, ID ), do the same as A handling re-encryption key query in Phase 13 in the above theorem. 
. If so, return M . Otherwise, return ⊥.
• On (reencrypt, C ID , ID, ID 
to A and begins the GUESS stage. 4) Forgeries and Abort conditions The adversary may forge C 5 on (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ), but from the security of BLS short signature [7] , this probability is negligible.
Theorem 5: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-F is DGE-IBE-IND-ID-CCA secure for the delegator and proxy's colluding.
Proof: The security proof is same as the above theorem except that it does not allow "A issues up to rekey generation queries on (ID, ID * )", for B does not know the private key corresponding to ID * . Theorem 6: Suppose the DBDH assumption holds, then our scheme proposed in Section III-F is PKG-OW secure for the delegator, proxy and delegatee's colluding.
Proof: The security proof is same as the proof for Theorem 3.
IV. COMPARISON
In this section, we give our comparison results with other identity based proxy re-encryption schemes [15] , [11] , [27] , [29] . We compare our schemes with other schemes from two ways. First we concern about schemes' security, then we concern about schemes' efficiency.
Notations: In Table I , we denote with/without random oracle as W/O RO, assumption as Assum, security model as SecMod, colluding attackers as Colluding, underlying IBE as UnderIBE, stand model as Std, , proxy as P, DGA as delegator, DGE as delegatee. P and DGA means that proxy colludes with delegator, P or DGA means that proxy or delegator is malicious adversary but they never collude. SymEnc-Sec means the security of symmetric encryption. 2-ndCiph 1stCiph 2-ndCiph GA07A [15] 1te + 1tp 0 1tp 2tp 1tp 2|G| + 2|Ge| 1|G| + 1|Ge| GA07B [15] 1tp + 1te 2tp 2te + 2tp 1te + 2tp 2te + 2tp 1|G| + 1|Ge| 1|G| + 1|GT | +2|m| + |id| +1|Ge| + |m| M07B [27] 1tp + 2te 2tp 1tp 2tp 2tp 2|Ge| + 1|GT | 2|Ge| + 1|GT | CT07 [11] 3te + 1tp + 1ts 1tv 2te 2te + 10tp + 1tv 2te + 3tp 9|G| + 2|GT | 3|G| + |GT | +|vk| + |s| +|vk| + |s| SXC08 [29] From Table I , we can know that our IBPRE scheme based on a variant of BB 1 IBE scheme is the most secure IBPRE. M07B scheme is the weakest IBPRE for it can only achieve IND-Pr-sID-CPA under separated proxy or delegator or delegatee attack.
In Table II , we denote encryption as Enc, reencryption as Reenc, decryption as Dec, ciphertext as Ciph and ciphertext length as Ciph-Len. t p , t e and t me represent the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multi-exponentiation respectively, while t s and t v represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verification respectively. |G|, |Z q |, |G e | and |G T | denote the bit -length of an element in groups G, Z q , G e and G T respectively. Here G and Z q denote the groups used in our scheme, while G e and G T are the bilinear groups used in GA07, CT07, SXC08 schemes, i.e., the bilinear pairing is e : G e × G e → G T . Finally, |vk| and |s| denote the bit length of the one-time signature's public key and a one-time signature respectively.
From Table II , Our schemes 3 , GA07 4 and M07B schemes are much more efficient than CT07 and SXC08 scheme due to their underlying IBE is Waters' IBE. And for the proxy, CT07 and SXC08 scheme are much more efficient than others for their special paradigm, our IBPRE scheme is more efficient than GA07B scheme and our other schemes, we think this is important for resisting DDos attack against the proxy.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In 2007, Matsuo proposed the concept of four types of PRE schemes: CBE to CBE, IBE to CBE, CBE to IBE and IBE to IBE [27] . In Matsuo's scheme, they allow the PKG to help the delegator and the delegatee to generate re-encryption key. We explore this feature further, if we allow PKG to generate re-encryption keys by directly using master − key, many open problems can be solved. Considering the standardization of BB 1 IBE and its broad applications, we give new identity based proxy re-encryption schemes based on BB 1 IBE, and prove its security in our new stronger security models. Furthermore, our schemes are very efficient for the reencryption process, which is the most heavy-load part of PRE.
